Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD and American Federation of Government Employees, WA-RP-90035, September 12, 2003, 59 FLRA No. 26.

In a split decision, FLRA reversed the Regional Director and found that incumbents of the disputed Physical Security Specialist (PSS) and Electronics Technician (ET) positions are engaged in §7112(b)(6) security work directly affecting national security and are therefore excluded from the bargaining unit.

[T]he incumbents of the two PSS positions and the ET position perform work that involves the design, analyzing or monitoring of security systems for the security of, and access to, SSA's databases and physical facilities, and that these systems are directly related to the protection of the economic and productive strength of the Nation, including the security of the Government from sabotage, particularly its databases and physical facilities. . . [Emphasis added.]

When the union filed a clarification-of-unit petition seeking to include six incumbents of two PSS and one ET position in its nationwide consolidated unit of professional and nonprofessional employees, the Regional Director concluded that although the incumbents performed "security work," the security work they performed didn't directly affect national security. Therefore they were included in the unit.

SSA filed an application for review which was granted in part by the Authority in 58 FLRA No.42. FLRA there asked the parties to address the following questions:

(1) Whether, and how, the security work performed by the incumbents of the PSS, PD #8B349; PSS, PD # 8B356; and ET positions involves "national security" as that phrase is defined in Oak Ridge, 4 FLRA at 655-56.

(2) If the security work performed by the incumbents national security, then does it "directly affect" national security, as that phrase is defined in Oak Ridge, 4 FLRA at 655-56, and, if so, how?

It also published a Federal Register notice inviting interested parties to address these issues. There were many responses, which the Authority summarized before undertaking its analysis.

It noted that in Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, 4 FLRA No. 85 (Oak Ridge) it had defined security work as including "the design, analysis, or monitoring of security systems and procedures[,]" but not including "work involving mere access to and use of sensitive information and material." That definition was modified in Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 58 FLRA No. 5 (DOJ), to include "the regular use of, or access to, classified information."

It defined the term national security to include only

those sensitive activities of the government that are directly related to the protection and preservation of the military, economic, and productive strength of the United States, including the security of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs, against or from espionage, sabotage, subversion, foreign aggression, and any other illegal acts which adversely affect the national defense.

And it defined directly affects as "a straight bearing or unbroken connection that produces a material influence or [alteration]."

The Authority reaffirmed these definitions in the case at bar. It did make clear, however, in response to a DoD argument, that employees may perform security work, even if they don't have security clearances. (The disputed positions in the case at bar don't require a security clearance.)

However, whether an employee has a security clearance and/or occupies a position designated as sensitive are significant factors in making a determination under §7112(b)(6). . . . Nevertheless, the absence of such factors does not automatically compel a conclusion that §7112(b)(6) is inapplicable in a particular situation. Rather, . . . determinations under §7112(b)(6) are to be based on the entire record as presented by the parties and developed during the representation proceeding.

In applying the above to the positions at issue, it disagreed with the Regional Director's determination regarding the seriousness of the impact on the economy if the information contained in SSA's facilities were lost due to tragedy. (The RD had reasoned that SSA's backup recovery system would allow claims to be paid, even if many of them had to be processed manually.)

We find, contrary to the RD's determination, that disruption in the SSA's ability to process claims and make social security payments would have a serious adverse effect on the economic strength of the country. The record demonstrates, as argued by the Agency, that the fact that a back up recovery system exists and claims could be paid manually does not change the national security implications of a major disruption in the Agency's ability to process claims and make social security payments. . . . We agree with the Agency that "when 40 million people do not receive their Social Security checks on time or in the right amount, there is a tremendous impact [on] the economy of the United States."

After summarizing some of the RD's findings regarding the work done by the incumbents of the disputed positions, FLRA concluded that their work involved the design, analysis, or monitoring of security systems and that these security systems are directly related to the protection of the economic and productive strength of the U.S. In FLRA's words:

In sum, the record shows, and we find, that the incumbents of the two PSS positions and the ET position perform work that involves the design, analyzing or monitoring of security systems for the security of, and access to, SSA's databases and physical facilities, and that these systems are directly related to the protection of the economic and productive strength of the Nation, including the security of the Government from sabotage, particularly its databases and physical facilities. We note in particular that although the incumbents of the PSS positions also sometimes perform other duties that do not affect national security, they do not lose their national security status simply because they are not engaged in matters related to national security all of the time. . . . [W]e find that the disputed employees are engaged in security work which "directly affects national security" within the meaning of §7112(b)(6) of the Statute.

Member Pope, who found that the duties of the incumbents of the ET positions directly affected national security, disagreed with the majority regarding the incumbents of the two PSS positions.

The majority's conclusion that all of these employees are excluded from the unit is not based on a finding that there is a direct connection between their duties and national security. Rather, the majority finds that these employees work on 'systems' that 'are directly related to' national security. . . . This line of reasoning permits just what the Statute does not. . . . By focusing on the systems the employees support, rather than the employees' work itself, the majority in effect modifies the statutory standard, permitting exclusion where the connection is indirect, rather than direct.