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    Labor Management Relations Glossary

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    Midterm Bargaining

    Literally, all bargaining that takes place during the life of the contract. See, e.g., 51 FLRA No. 68. Usually contrasted with term bargaining--i.e., with the renegotiation of an expired (or expiring) contract. Midterm bargaining includes I&I bargaining, union-initiated midterm bargaining on new matters; and bargaining pursuant to a reopener clause. It excludes matters that are already "covered by" the term agreement. In NFFE v. Interior, 526 U.S. 86 (1999), the Supreme Court, finding that the statute was ambiguous on the matter of midterm bargaining, held that FLRA's interpretation was entitled to considerable court deference. After the Court's remand, the Authority, in 56 FLRA No. 6, in effect reaffirmed the position it held before the 4th Circuit held that a union had no right to initiate midterm bargaining. That is, FLRA held that "agencies are obligated to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement on negotiable union proposals concerning matters not 'contained in or covered by' the existing agreement unless the union has waived its right to bargain about the subject matter involved."

    Union-initiated Midterm Bargaining on New Matters

    Absent a bargaining waiver, the union has the right to initiate bargaining on matters not "covered by" the CBA. In NFFE v. Interior, 526 U.S. 86 (1999), the Supreme Court, disagreeing with the "absolutist" views of both the D.C. and the 4th Circuits and instead finding that the statute was ambiguous on the matter of midterm bargaining, held that FLRA's interpretation was entitled to considerable court deference. After the Court's remand, the Authority, in 56 FLRA No. 6, in effect reaffirmed the position it held before the 4th Circuit held the union had no right to initiate midterm bargaining.

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